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CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

V. SOCIOLOGY AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

It is maintained by some that there is nothing new in sociology; that it is simply a new name for that which has long been called the philosophy of history; that human events make up its basis of fact; and that the only scientific treatment possible is the co-ordination of those facts and the tracing of their dependence, their antecedence and sequence—in short, their causal relations. Some color is given to this view by Comte's masterly summing up,¹ under the head of social dynamics, of the course of history through the celebrated *trois états* in the fifth and sixth volumes of his *Positive Philosophy*. Dr. Paul Barth, in the suggestive work already referred to, entitled *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, lays stress on this fact, and promises in a second part of his work to justify more fully its title. But in the first part, devoted to a review of sociological literature, he has certainly increased the difficulty of his task by enumerating the facts and principles furnished by biology, psychology, anthropology, and many other departments widely separated from human history.

Comte was deeply impressed with the necessity of connecting the events of history together into such a series that their future occurrence could be predicted from the past. He says:

¹“These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass of an essay like the present to give even a faint conception of the extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be made a science should suspend his judgment until he has read these volumes of M. Comte.”—JOHN STUART MILL, *Westminster Review*, Vol. LXXXIII (N. S., Vol. XXVII), April 1, 1865, pp. 396, 397; *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (bound with *Later Speculations of M. Comte*), 1st American, from and uniform with 3d London ed. (Philadelphia, 1866), p. 106.

It is undeniable . . . that history has not yet ceased to possess an essentially literary or descriptive character, and has not acquired a true scientific character by finally establishing a rational filiation in the succession of social events, so as to permit, as in other departments of phenomena, and within the general limits imposed by their higher complexity, a certain systematic prevision of their further succession.¹

He does not characterize as philosophy of history the fifth and sixth volumes of his *Positive Philosophy*, but on the title-page, and also in the preface of the third volume, of his *Positive Polity*, "containing the social dynamics or general treatment of human progress," he adds the words: "Philosophie de l'histoire." But he does not imply that that one volume constitutes the whole of sociology. In fact, he always made sociology exactly synonymous with "social physics," which embraces social statics as well as social dynamics, and no one has attempted to identify social statics with the philosophy of history. Nevertheless, Barth, who is perfectly familiar with Comte, says that "a perfect sociology would be exactly coextensive with the philosophy of history; they differ at bottom only in name."² It is curious that Lilienfeld,³ whose standpoint is so strictly biological, should accept this view of Barth, but he says that it can only be realized through the application of the organic method. He is probably alone in being able to see any rational connection between the two methods. Tarde, on the other hand, declares that "it was not sociology that Comte founded; it is a simple philosophy of history that he offers us under this name, but admirably drawn up; it is the last word of the philosophy of history."⁴ And De Greef, much to the same effect, remarks that "the sociology of Comte does not, properly speaking, merit that title; it is rather a philosophy of the history of ideas."⁵ All such statements result from the tendency to ignore everything else in Comte's sociology but his historical review of human thought through the three stages: theological, metaphysical, and positive. These writers forget that

¹ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, p. 206.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

³ *Zur Vertheidigung der organischen Methode in der Sociologie* (Berlin, 1898), p. 31.

⁴ *Les lois sociales* (Paris, 1898), p. 123.

⁵ *Introduction à la sociologie*, première partie (Bruxelles et Paris, 1886), p. 226.

Comte insisted that sociology was simply the last of a series of affiliated sciences, and as such virtually embraced them all. If they would read again the fourth volume of the *Positive Philosophy*, "containing the dogmatic part of social philosophy" (see title-page), they would discover how much broader Comte's sociology was than they seem to suppose.

Tarde has given his idea of the difference between sociology and the philosophy of history in the following terms :

The philosophy of history, as it is understood from Bossuet—so much admired by Comte—to Hegel and his French disciples, is wholly different from sociology. The latter pretends to formulate laws of formation or development applicable to all societies real or possible, considered primarily as independent of one another and separately evolving. But the philosophy of history relates only to the known societies, indeed, only to the small number of these latter that form a continuous chain from Egypt and Chaldea, through Greece and Rome, to modern Europe.¹

It is, of course, natural and proper that sociology should deal mainly with the line of leading civilizations and races, because these represent the last and highest stages of culture and civilization, and present the most complex and difficult phenomena for investigation. They also possess a far greater practical interest than the outlying and more backward races and civilizations. Comte laid stress upon this as the final goal of the science, and he did not treat uncivilized and savage races, leaving us to infer that his acquaintance with anthropology was limited. I regard this as one of the great merits of his work, because, as was remarked in the first paper of this series, the temptation is so strong to permit the treatment of the lower races to absorb all attention, and thus narrow sociology down to mere anthropology.

Dr. Georg Simmel has also attempted to draw the line between sociology and the philosophy of history. He says :

This special task of sociology must be separated strictly from the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history seeks to bring historical facts, external as well as psychical, in their entirety, under general concepts, by virtue of which history may satisfy certain demands, ethical, metaphysical, religious, and artistic. In complete opposition to this, sociology as a special

¹ *Revue internationale de sociologie*, septième année, 1899, pp. 456, 457.

science, the eventual scope of which I have attempted here to determine, restricts itself entirely to the realm of phenomena and their immediate psychological explanation.¹

Dr. Ludwig Stein states the distinction as follows:

Sociology is distinguished from the philosophy of history not less in its method than in its aims, by sharply drawn lines. It of course shares with the philosophy of history the problem—the development of society—but not its methods of solving it. If, for example, the philosophy of history in its course thus far has proceeded to construct deductively, sociology seeks first to collect together all the empirical facts of social life accessible to scientific investigation, and then to sift them in order finally to describe in a logical inductive system the totality of all social facts within the range of human experience.²

Finally might be cited the now somewhat classic reply of Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) to the declaration of Fustel de Coulanges that sociology is the same thing as history, “the science of social acts”:

I can scarcely think that these two words can be employed as synonyms. In some respects history means more than sociology. Accidents, successions, dynasties, can scarcely enter into sociology; while the discussion of questions concerning education, health, the condition of the poor, and many other circumstances that contribute in large measure to the prosperity and well-being of mankind, have not formed, so to speak, any part of history, at least down to the present time.

There are then portions of history that do not enter into the domain of sociology, and questions of sociology that do not enter into that of history. How sad it is that historians have so neglected the social side of history! We find pages and even chapters devoted to wars, battles, and struggles for power, while the social condition of the people is entirely omitted, or treated in a phrase or two.

It is said: “happy is the people that has no history.” No history? There cannot be a people without a history. It may be that history will consist of the development and of the quiet and silent growth of a people; but that is none the less a history, and it is for this very reason the more instructive and the more interesting.³

This might be fittingly supplemented by the comment of

¹ *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. VI (Philadelphia, 1895), p. 419.

² *Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1897), p. 24.

³ *Annales de l'Institut international de Sociologie*, Vol. I, p. 2. Opening address of the first president of the institute.

M. Alfred Fouillée, another president of the same institute, who says :

Sir John Lubbock is right ; only one may say that he himself seems to absorb sociology too much in its concrete applications, in what are called "social questions," *i. e.*, in the economic condition of the people. Sociology properly so called studies, as we have seen, the laws themselves and the ends of life in society, the forms that this life may take on, and the succession of these forms. It asks for light from history, from political economy, and from jurisprudence, but in order to give it back to them in turn, and especially to give them unity of principle, of method, and of aim. Sociology is then a science apart ; it is no more to be confounded with history than mechanics is to be confounded with the description of the various states of the heavens at various cosmographic epochs.¹

VI. SOCIOLOGY AS THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES.

It is maintained by some that sociology is not a science in the proper sense, but simply a term employed to embrace a large group of more or less cognate sciences or subjects that are separately referred to as special social sciences. On this view all of these sciences together constitute sociology, and each of them belongs to it, but there is no implication of any organic relation among the special social sciences, or of anything in sociology that is distinct from them or peculiar to itself. Although these various sciences or groups of phenomena are admitted to be interrelated in various ways and degrees, there is no special way in which they are conceived as related to sociology, which may be looked upon as merely a mechanical mixture of them all. We will first inquire what are the principal special social sciences thus conceived as together constituting sociology. The following enumeration of the so-called special social sciences includes such as I have casually noted in the course of my reading, and does not pretend to be complete, rational, or methodical. The passages have been noted, and the references might have been given if their importance had warranted the space they would occupy. I give the list thus *in extenso*, merely to show how wide a range has been given to sociology by a large number of writers. As will be seen, it

¹ *Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde* (Paris, 1896), pp. 234, 235.

practically covers all science and all knowledge, the particular ones omitted merely representing the defectiveness of the record, which the reader can doubtless complete. To make this more clear I have attempted a rough classification based primarily on the accepted order of increasing complexity of the sciences, but necessarily losing much of this character when the higher and more aberrant groups are reached. Many of the terms used are virtually synonymous, but, as some might see differences of meaning or application, I give many such as I find them. Wherever there is a clear subordination it is indicated by indenting those that apparently stand under others of the same more general group. I have also indicated the synonyms by indenting them, which will not probably lead to any confusion.

THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES.

Mathematics.	Demology.
Mechanics.	<i>Culturgeschichte.</i>
Astronomy.	Palethnology.
Geology.	Archæology.
Geography.	Anthropometry.
Political geography.	Anthroposociology.
Social geography.	Statistics.
Physics.	Social arithmetic.
The law of probabilities.	Language.
Chemistry.	Linguistics.
Biology.	Philology.
Anatomy.	Science of language.
Physiology.	Semantics.
Paleontology.	Ethics.
Psychology.	Social ethics.
Social psychology.	Deontology (Ludwig Stein).
Social physics (Quêtelet's use of the term).	Customs.
Descriptive sociology.	Religion.
Anthropology.	Science of religions.
Criminal anthropology.	Philosophy of religion.
Criminal sociology.	Comparative religion.
Ethnography.	Theology.
Ethnology.	Philosophy.
Demography.	Logic.

Medicine.	International law.
Medical jurisprudence.	Diplomacy.
Pathology.	Civil law.
Psychiatry.	Criminal law.
Art.	Political science.
Æsthetics.	Politics.
Architecture.	Philosophy of state.
History.	Legislation.
History of civilization.	Labor legislation.
Philosophy of history.	Civics.
Economics.	Administration.
Political economy.	Finance.
Jurisprudence.	Banking.
Law.	Taxation.
Comparative law.	Pedagogy.
Philosophy of law.	Science.

Without commenting on this list, with all its crudities and even absurdities, it may be frankly admitted that the fields of knowledge that it covers embrace practically all that sociology can have to deal with. It is obvious that there could be no sociology until the greater number of these fields had been cultivated. It may even be admitted—and I for one would strongly insist upon it—that sociology cannot be properly studied without a fundamental acquaintance with those more general sciences that I have put at the head of the list. And their utility for the sociologist increases as the fields grow more complex, until biology, anthropology, and psychology become absolutely indispensable.

What, then, is the relation of the special social sciences to sociology? Schaeffle calls them the building stones out of which sociology is constructed. But this is a very rough, if not entirely erroneous, comparison. Sociology is not exactly a structure built of these materials. It is rather a generalization from them all. It abstracts from each all that is common and forms a sort of head, to which they constitute, as it were, the body and limbs. In short, sociology is an integration or synthesis of the whole body of social sciences. Wundt has set forth this distinction very clearly, referring everything to the special social sciences, except the general conceptions and principles

of social life.¹ For my own part I prefer to see in the special social sciences the *data* of sociology. They furnish the facts, and sociology co-ordinates them. Many of them furnish great co-ordinated groups of facts and special laws well established in their own domains. Sociology treats these as units, and groups these groups into higher and more general conceptions. Sociology furnishes the highest of all generalizations. It is an abstract science, dealing with the laws and principles of all the other sciences. It stands at the summit of the hierarchy of the sciences, and derives its truths from the entire series with increasing directness from physics and chemistry to biology and psychology. It can be properly understood only when considered from this point of view, and it should not be taught until regularly reached in this natural order of the sciences. In teaching it, therefore, anthropology and history, psychology and biology, and *a fortiori* the simpler branches of a common education, should be assumed as the necessary preparation supposed to have been made. The teacher can then proceed direct to principles. Without such preparation he must stop at every step and actually teach these ancillary sciences before he can begin his instruction in sociology proper.

I would furthermore accept practically all the disciplines enumerated in the list as special social sciences, although their relation to sociology is of a widely varying character. There is, however, one which many regard as a science co-ordinate with sociology, and which the two leading sociologists of the world, Comte and Spencer, have actually placed above that science in the natural sequence of sciences. I refer, of course, to ethics. I have never been able to share this view, and I consider ethics rather a typical social science, in so far as it is a science at all. In the first place, the ethical idea is essentially and necessarily social. It always implies a feeling creature as the recipient of the action, whether good or bad. Its basis is sympathy or altruism, either of which terms requires at least a duality of persons so related or associated as to exert an influence upon each other. There can be no sympathy without someone to

¹ *Logik*, zweite Auflage, Bd. II, Abth. II, pp. 438 (footnote), 447.

feel with. There can be no altruism without an *alter*. This seems effectually to dispose of Spencer's claim to a distinct science of ethics. In the second place, it is hard to make anyone see that Comte's *morale* was practically identical with sociability, and as such was simply an extension or special amplification of his general conception of sociology. But anyone who will carefully examine his *Politique positive* from this point of view cannot fail to be struck with this fact. Here we find no moralizing, no flourishing of ethical precepts, no hortatory appeals to the moral sense, no laudation of moral conduct; in fact, nothing that at all resembles the current treatises on ethics, or "moral science," as a code of action designed to restrain evil-doing and encourage well-doing. Instead of this we find a scientific treatise on the evolution of altruism through sociability. It is in its earliest stages that this is most clear, and with primitive man, as all know, the ethical sense was confined to the nearest of kin. We must come down to very advanced nations to find the recognition of any distinct moral obligation toward the members of other nations and races. The anthropologists have clearly seen this, and they have considerable difficulty in distinguishing the moral from the social.¹ M. E. de Roberty,² one of the most enlightened followers of Comte, has ably and fully elaborated this view. It is, in fact, the "social consensus" of Comte and the "solidarity" of current sociological literature, and it all rests on sociability, or a certain mutual interest which the members of society take in one another. This is the root of altruism and of all ethics, and is an exclusively social sentiment.

The conception of sociology as consisting of all the special social sciences unaccompanied by any idea of their relations is of course an extreme one, and could not be entertained by anyone who recognized as special social sciences all those enumerated in the above list. Those who thus think of sociology do so in a vague way and have in mind only a few of the related

¹ "Ces deux termes sont presque synonymes."—CH. LETOURNEAU, *Revue mensuelle de l'École d'Anthropologie de Paris*, Vol. XI, 15 novembre, 1898, p. 339.

² *Le bien et le mal* (Paris, 1896), *passim*.

sciences. Nevertheless the number of such persons is very large, while the number of those who think closely and carefully on the subject is small. Hence it seemed worth while to devote a little space to this somewhat popular view. It may be well, before leaving the subject, to advert to the opposite extreme, which is also somewhat prevalent. When any one subject is allowed to engross the mind, it is apt to assume undue prominence and engender extreme views with regard to it. Even sociology may become in some minds a sort of fetic. This tendency is seen in what may be called the *objectivation* of social phenomena. Too much is often made of the social consciousness, and society itself seems to be conceived by some as a sort of independent being or entity. Mr. Spencer did good service in checking this tendency by laying special stress on the fact that the fundamental distinction between society and an organism is that the former is incapable of enjoyment or suffering, and exists only for the good of its individual members, each of which is thus capable. Attacks on the social order are to be deprecated, not because it is possible to hurt the social order as a feeling creature, but because any disturbance of the social order reacts upon the individual who is a feeling creature. No one has ever, to my knowledge, questioned this proposition, and it is really little more than a truism.

Professor Émile Durkheim, of the University of Bordeaux, has made the largest claims for sociology as a science *sui generis* and for the fundamental difference between social phenomena and those of any other class. His views have been severely attacked by Tarde and others, and the discussion has proved very fruitful. This is not the place to enter into it, nor do I think it worth while to do so at all. There is a basis of truth in Durkheim's position, which is not altogether new. Whether we consider the relation of society to its units or of sociology to the special social sciences, there can be no doubt that the analogy which he uses of a chemical compound as distinguished from a mechanical mixture is the most instructive that has been adduced. But Spencer used it long ago and in a much broader sense, and it had doubtless been used by others before him. Certainly

many, including myself, have made much of it for many years. I merely mention it here in order to say that this really important question which involves it belongs to a large class and can best be treated in another place where it is appropriate to deal with all the rest.

VII. SOCIOLOGY AS THE DESCRIPTION OF SOCIAL FACTS.

The idea that science consists in the description of facts, or in the accumulation of a mass of facts, is a very common one, not only as a popular notion, but also among specialists in many branches, especially in the field of biology, formerly called "natural history." In my early botanical experience I was impressed with the fact that the botanists I knew cared chiefly for collecting all the plants in any locality and making a catalogue of them. That was their idea of botany as a science. Things are changed now, and most botanists are more interested in the morphological and histological study of plants. But in this they often become absorbed in the study of some special organ or kind of tissue, and look upon the microscopic observation of certain minute structures and their exhaustive description as constituting the science. It is evidently the same in zoölogy. I do not say that either of these methods is not scientific. Both are necessary to the progress of science, but neither in and of itself advances science. It is not until some competent investigator takes up the isolated results thus attained, and brings them together into some orderly connection and constructs some kind of system, that any scientific truth is established. For science does not consist in facts, but in their relations, and these can be made known only by reasoning about the facts first collected, observed, and described.

It is not, therefore, surprising that there should be sociologists who look upon the collection and description of facts as constituting sociology. This would result from the nature of the human mind, if there were no other cause. The two opposite types of mind, the analytic and the synthetic, have been described by many philosophers. Naturalists are divided by this principle into two opposing camps; for, although all must

observe, describe, and classify, the one class, impressed by the differences in things and the multiplicity of facts in nature, tend to divide and subdivide and multiply species and groups, while the other, embarrassed by the resemblances and common characters that they see among all objects, tend to combine and merge their species and groups and reduce their number. The former are called "splitters" and the latter "lumpers," and these follow each other over every field of science, each undoing the work of the other in the matter of classification. To outsiders this seems to lead to utter confusion, but in practice it really causes little inconvenience.

Most of the "descriptive sociology" that has been done and of that which has been recommended properly belongs to anthropology, *i. e.*, to ethnography. There it is of the highest value to the sociologist as furnishing the data for sociology. The plan of monographing the facts of family life of the lower classes in civilized society, as pursued by Le Play and his school, belongs to sociology, or perhaps to demography. The very thought of making it universal or sufficiently extensive to form a reliable guide to the sociologist is appalling, and I have yet to learn of any important use that sociologists have been able to make of the work that has been done thus far. Most of the rest of the materials available for sociology are derived from history. History is the sociologist's great storehouse, and it cannot be said that the resources are meager. Next to fiction, history probably forms the largest department of literature. It is, of course, justly charged that history does not furnish all that the sociologist demands and requires. This is no modern discovery. Condorcet, writing in 1795 or earlier, said :

Thus far political history, as well as that of philosophy and of science, has only been the history of a few men ; that which really forms the human species, the mass of families who subsist almost entirely by their labor, has been forgotten.¹

The note thus sounded has been re-echoed all through the nineteenth century, until the "great-man theory" and *histoire-bataille* have come to describe what has hitherto usually passed

¹ *Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (Paris, 1900), p. 158.

for history. But in its stead has arisen the "historical school" of economists, and no one can deny that this school is furnishing the real materials for sociology, so far as they can be gleaned from history and literature. Sociologists are already using them, and will use them more and more. I have sometimes thought that more could be extracted from literature than is commonly supposed. If sociologists would go about it in some such way as Mr. Spencer accomplished his *Descriptive Sociology*, important results could be attained. If the early literature, like that of Greece and Rome, of India, Egypt, Persia, Syria, and China, could be thoroughly sifted for social facts, the labor, though great, would be well repaid. Such writers did not intentionally inform the world as to the industrial, economic, and social condition of the ages and countries in which they lived and wrote, but on every page occur words that are full of meaning for the sociologist who will carefully weigh them and learn what they imply. The same would be true of the sagas and numerous traditional poems that have come down to us, such as the *Nibelungen Lied*, the *Ossian Tales*, the *Kalevala*, and the *Heliand*, as well as the oriental *Mahabharata* and *Shah-Namah*, the Indian *Vedas*, the Persian *Avesta*, and other sacred books. Some praiseworthy attempts in this general direction have already been made, such, for example, as De Greef's *Croyances et doctrines politiques* and *Transformisme social*, and Coste's *Expérience des peuples et les prévisions qu'elle autorise*.

M. René Worms has proposed a form of descriptive sociology which is an advance upon that of Herbert Spencer.¹ It relates to advanced societies as well as to the uncivilized races, and looks to the present as well as to the past. It thus leads naturally to the next stage in the study of society, which he properly calls comparative sociology.

The next great reservoir of social facts, after ethnography and history, is statistics. This branch is being pushed with great energy, and often has the resources of great states behind it. It only needs to be wisely directed, and it will prove of inestimable value to the sociologist.

¹ *Revue internationale de sociologie*, Vol. I (Paris, 1893), pp. 9 ff.

But there is still another source of social facts, as yet without a name, but always taken into account, and which is perhaps of more value to the sociologist than any of the foregoing. This is the sociologist's own social environment. If he would only recognize it, the facts he is seeking lie all about him. From birth to death he is literally bathed in a social medium and breathes a social atmosphere. In some respects sociology is at a disadvantage in having men for its subjects. It has some difficulty in collecting specimens, and more in taking them to pieces for analysis, though even these things are accomplished; but it has this great advantage that it never lacks for material. It does not have to go in search of subjects for study. On every hand they are always present. Neither are they shy or wild, so that it is necessary to trap or shoot them in order to get near enough to them to make close observations. Ornithologists and other zoölogists often strive to conceal themselves and bait their birds and animals, so that they can be observed in their natural condition, or they employ the field-glass to bring them nearer to them, but this is attended with great difficulties and requires patience and skill. But the sociologist can always observe men from as close range as he pleases, and see them acting naturally and without fear or constraint.

No sociologist realizes how much use he unconsciously makes of his social environment. He not only studies the objects and the facts and phenomena of society in this way, but he is able to study the laws and principles of social life, and work out the finest theories of social action in the highest domains of psychic and spiritual activity. Kant, who never quitted Königsberg, could probe to the bottom the deepest problems of thought and conduct. A sociologist scarcely need travel to prosecute his researches. With a library of books he can learn what men have done in the past. His newspaper tells him what they are doing at present in all parts of the world. In his family, neighborhood, town, or city he daily meets man, and he has learned that men are fundamentally alike the world over and in all ages. It is, of course, better that he travel, and

the more the better, provided he do not subordinate his reflective to his perceptive faculties. But sociology may almost be made a closet study, and the sociologist may study society in narrow surroundings, just as some truly great naturalists have practically spent their lives in their cabinets.

Sociology, therefore, in its more restricted and proper sense, is of all sciences perhaps the least to be regarded as a descriptive science. This is not because it ignores facts. It uses far more facts than any other science. But it is because its facts are supplied by other ancillary special social sciences—ethnography, demography, history, statistics, and the ever-present social environment, which might be called *mesography* when it is observed, recorded, and utilized by the sociologist. It is the special province of the sociologist to *use* these multitudinous resources and materials, and to construct the social system. It is induction on a vast scale, accompanied, as all induction always is, by sound deduction, or reasoning and interpretation. It is an abstract science in one sense, but not in the sense of dispensing with concrete facts, since all its results are derived from the study of concrete facts and of the relations that subsist among them. M. de Roberty holds that sociology is essentially a descriptive science, while at the same time claiming that it is an abstract science. I am unable to understand this, as it seems rather to be a contradiction of terms. He must use both words in some special sense peculiar to his own philosophy, with which in its main aspects I find myself in full accord. But here I would agree with Cosentini that “to stop at the descriptive stage is to condemn the science to remaining in a rudimentary state.”¹ Sociology is an organizing, generalizing, co-ordinating science, calculated to extract social truths from social facts. Facts, in and of themselves, are of little value, and may even impede the progress of science. “Though there must be data before there can be generalization, yet ungeneralized data, accumulated in excess, are impediments to generalization.”² But observation and reasoning must always be combined in order to

¹ *Revue internationale de sociologie*, June, 1898, p. 432.

² HERBERT SPENCER, *The Study of Sociology*, p. 267.

be fruitful. "*Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer; Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.*"¹ "*Il n'existe aucune séparation absolue entre observer et raisonner.*"² "In the scientific world the accumulation of facts has outstripped the work of valid generalization. For while men of moderate ability can observe, experiment, and multiply details in special departments, it requires men of breadth to arrange them into groups, to educe principles, and arrive at comprehensive laws."³

But the facts that the sociologist is to use should be verified and ascertained to be true and reliable; otherwise, no one need be told, they are worse than no facts at all. The unreliability of the accounts of travelers among uncivilized races of men has been emphasized again and again. Condorcet, a little later on in the same passage that I have quoted, refers to it and gives most of the reasons why it is so. How much of Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology* can be depended upon? One would suppose that accounts of civilized peoples given by persons from other civilized countries who go among them would contain no serious error. Yet everybody knows that this is not the case. Only such exceptional observers as de Tocqueville or James Bryce have ever accurately described American affairs. I have recently had this fact forcibly brought home to me in reading Vaccaro's *Bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état*, a work that contains much that is of the highest value to the sociologist. But toward the close the author essays to support his conclusions by appealing to facts, and lays several countries under contribution, and especially the United States. Nearly every statement in his chapter on democracy in America (pp. 409-26) is false in fact, and a large part of the chapter is stupid and ridiculous. I am no apologist of the political system of this country, and any American sociologist could have furnished him with facts that no one could challenge, better adapted to sustain his contention than the false statements he makes. After reading this, my faith in all accounts of foreign countries of which I have no personal knowledge was

¹ KANT, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1868), p. 82.

² AUGUSTE COMTE, *Politique positive*, Vol. I, p. 500.

³ E. L. YOUMANS, *Popular Science Monthly*, November, 1874, Vol. VI, p. 44.

completely shaken. If an Italian (or a Frenchman, for it is such a person whom he so unquestioningly quotes) cannot give a more correct account of what is going on in America than what we have here, how much dependence can we place in what we are told about China or Japan, or India? And if it is so difficult to observe contemporary social phenomena, what shall we say of phenomena of past ages as embodied in human history? Are the social facts that the sociologist can command sufficiently reliable to be trusted and built upon? And, if not, what criterion of truth shall we apply to our materials? Of course, we should verify them if possible, but in the majority of cases it is not possible. The only test in such cases, if they are to be used at all, seems to be their inherent reasonableness. If they are at all anomalous or contrary to what we know of the laws governing human action and human thought, they are to be doubted and rejected. But this knowledge of "human nature" we derive mainly from the social environment, so that ethnography, demography, history, and even statistics must be made to square with the teachings of social mesography. It is, I repeat, truth rather than fact that is demanded. In a certain sense, fiction is more reliable than history. If the author of a work of fiction is a true artist, he sees certain great social truths and proceeds to bring them out in the strongest possible light. He does not pretend that his facts are true. He realizes, as does the reader, that it is of no consequence whether such and such characters, with the names he gives them, really lived or not, or whether the particular events, so graphically described, actually took place. No one supposes that they did. I have known narrow-minded people who condemned all fiction as a bundle of lies. But the world has always recognized that the accurate portrayal of human life and character is truth, and that names and events are of no consequence.

The general conclusion under this head is that sociology does not consist in the description of social facts, which belongs to subordinate sciences; that it is not a descriptive science, but a constructive science; that its method is not chiefly analytic, but synthetic. At the same time it must not be forgotten that all relations are either between primary concrete facts or else between

other such relations, so that it is never safe to take a new step in generalization until every previous step in the series of combinations upon which it rests has been thoroughly tested.

VIII. SOCIOLOGY AS ASSOCIATION.

By omitting the word "human" I make this conception broad enough to include what has been called animal sociology, upon which many so strongly insist. I have no objection to the expression except as tending to confound what seem to me to be two generically distinct things. M. Espinas has done most excellent service in bringing together into a compact form the numerous facts recorded in many obscure places by naturalists in all departments bearing upon animal association. He has also added much from his own observation, and he has enriched his work by an introduction dealing with the broadest aspects of the subject, including its relation to human association. The treatment is of the most enlightened character, and its author cannot be classed among those who maintain that there is a regular gradation or series of very short steps leading all the way from the lowest colonies or chains of animals to the highest human societies. Hobbes naturally denied all similarity between animal and human societies. Comte saw the resemblance, but said that animal operations were purely statical, while those of men were also dynamic.¹ Espinas shows how this is.² The real distinction is that animals do not transform the environment in a permanent way in their own interest. This subject is too large to be discussed here, but the basis of it all is the difference between instinct and reason. Even if we admit with Espinas, and indeed most clear thinkers, that instinct has the germs of reason at its base, still, for all practical purposes, and in their general results, they must be regarded as distinct; hence the fundamental distinction between human and animal societies.

Next as to the principles upon which association rests. There are a number of them, some merely biological, as in the transition from the Protozoa to the Metazoa, the laws of seg-

¹ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, p. 313.

² *Sociétés animales*, 2^e édition (Paris, 1878), pp. 442, 443.

mentation, and the entire philosophy of the composite animal body. These we need not discuss. The association of the higher organisms takes place under psychic laws. The phenomena are complex, but there are two principal causes, the one connected with feeling, the other with reason; but these usually or always work together, and can be separated only in thought for purposes of analysis. These principles are, respectively, the consciousness of kind and the survival of the social.

Consciousness of kind.—I adopt Professor Giddings's phrase as probably the clearest and most euphonious, at least in the English language, that has been proposed. The conception is a very old one, and perhaps I cannot better illustrate it than by quoting a few of the authors who have given more or less distinct expression to it. It means that there is a natural bond that draws like toward like. The Greeks were well aware of this, but neither had they failed to discover that there is also a mysterious charm that mutually attracts the unlike, and they discussed both these facts. The attraction of unlikes they could not, of course, understand, because it required a knowledge of hereditary intercrossing aided by natural selection to explain it. But the more common fact of the mutual attraction of the similar seemed natural, and Aristotle mentions it.¹ Such old adages as, "Birds of a feather flock together," and "Like seeks like," have come down to us from antiquity. That galaxy of contemporaries of the eighteenth century, Hume, Ferguson, and Adam Smith, were all interested in this and kindred questions, and Professor Giddings, in the preface to the third edition of his *Principles of Sociology* (p. x), admits that he derived the suggestion that grew into the conception of the consciousness of kind from Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*. Hume has put himself still more clearly on record as follows:

In all creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any advantages they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VIII, chap. i ("τὸν ὁμοῖον φασὶν ὦ τον ὁμοιον, καὶ κολοῖόν ποτὶ κολοῖόν").

creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages.¹

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his *Social Statics*, published in 1850, calls attention to Adam Smith's treatment of this subject in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, and says :

It is the aim of that work to show that the proper regulation of our conduct to one another is secured by means of a faculty whose function it is to excite in each being the emotions displayed by surrounding ones—a faculty which awakens a like state of sentiment, or, as he terms it, “a fellow-feeling with the passion of others”—the faculty, in short, which we commonly call Sympathy.²

Considerable more to the same general effect occurs in the closing chapter of the work entitled *General Considerations*. In the second volume of his *Principles of Psychology* he returns to the subject and says :

Sociality having thus commenced, and survival of the fittest tending ever to maintain and increase it, it will be further strengthened by the inherited effects of habit. The perception of kindred beings, perpetually seen, heard, and smelt, will come to form a predominant part of consciousness—so predominant a part that absence of it will inevitably cause discomfort. . . . Without further evidence we may safely infer that among creatures led step by step into gregariousness, there will little by little be established a pleasure in being together—a pleasure in the consciousness of one another's presence—a pleasure simpler than, and quite distinct from, those higher ones which it makes possible.³

M. Alfred Espinas, in his classical work on *Animal Societies*, originally prepared as his doctor's thesis, the first edition of which appeared in 1877, after having suffered badly at the hands of his inappreciative judges, had to meet this question on the threshold of his studies, and he has expressed himself very fully in numerous passages. I possess the second edition of 1878, received from the author's hand and now very rare, in which the highly philosophical and critical introduction, suppressed in the first edition, is restored, and from which the following quotations are taken. In a footnote on p. 173 he says :

¹ DAVID HUME, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by F. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London, 1898), Vol. II, p. 150.

² *Social Statics Abridged and Revised, etc.* (New York, 1892), p. 49.

³ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II (New York, 1873), p. 561.

It will be seen that we shall distinguish later on two principal causes that co-operate in the formation of societies: interest or utility more or less clearly felt, *i. e.*, the instinct of self-preservation on the one hand, and on the other sympathy. Here, in accidental societies, it is interest which seems to play the preponderant rôle; sympathy only consolidates the bonds which it has established. It also prevents societies from being formed among all kinds of creatures. Only those unite in a close and permanent way, among those who have an interest in doing so, that are capable of experiencing sympathy for one another. Otherwise we should see the strangest associations.

As regards normal societies, among animals of the same species, we have thought it necessary to give the first place to sympathy in the explanations that we have attempted, admitting the instinct of preservation only as an element that consolidates them. Indeed, sympathy has no other *raison d'être* than its future utility, although unknown to the beings that feel themselves thus drawn toward one another.

He uses the term "peuplade" for the fully formed social group of animals, and says (p. 470):

The true unit (*élément*) of the peuplade is the individual; and the love of a creature for its fellow-creatures (*semblables*) because they are such, or sympathy, is here the source of the collective consciousness.

On p. 475 he says:

It is then a pleasure for any living creature to have present around it creatures similar to itself, and this pleasure frequently felt cannot fail to create a need.

Again, on p. 545 he remarks:

But to love one another in their own image is to love all those who bear it, all those at least in which it can be recognized; all the members of the peuplade then form a part of the ego (*moi*) of each one, or, rather, there is no distinct *me* for them, there is only an *us*. Thus the evolution of the social sentiments is essentially a gradual transformation of egoism into altruism, or of the love of *me* into the love of *us*.

"L'attraction du même au même" is one of M. Espinas's favorite expressions. As it was he, in collaboration with M. Th. Ribot, who translated the *Principles of Psychology* into French, he was of course thoroughly imbued with Mr. Spencer's ideas.

Mr. Walter Bagehot's definition of a nation is quite *à propos* of the present discussion. It is as follows:

A nation means a *like* [*italics his*] body of men, because of that likeness

capable of acting together, and because of that likeness inclined to obey similar rules.¹

Gumplowicz clearly recognized the sentiment in his *Struggle of Races*, but he regarded it as derivative or acquired as a product of the struggle. He says of it as the basis of his *Syngenism*:

What now can be the cause of syngenism as an objective phenomenon that meets us in life and in history? Evidently only a feeling on the part of the individuals by virtue of which they feel themselves more strongly drawn and more closely attached to one group of men than to other groups of men.²

From the above citations, which it would be easy to multiply, it must be apparent that "consciousness of kind" is an old and familiar conception, and has only gained at Professor Giddings's hands a certain precision due to a euphonious expression, the distinctive character of which, however, is lost by translation into any other language. The German *Gattungsbewusstsein*, *Gattungsempfindung*, are like other German agglutinations, while the French *conscience d'espèce*, *conscience de l'espèce*, are wholly characterless. Tarde endeavors to identify it with *esprit de corps*,³ which would be equally euphonious with "consciousness of kind," but that phrase has acquired a somewhat different and less special meaning.

Professor Giddings first employed this phrase in 1895, preceded by a sort of definition. He said:

I have never thought or spoken of mere physical contact, hostile or friendly, as constituting association or a society. It is association *if and only if accompanied by a consciousness on the part of each of the creatures implicated that the creatures with which it comes in contact are like itself*. This consciousness of kind is the elementary, the generic social fact; it is sympathy, fellow feeling in the literal as distinguished from the popular sense of the word.⁴

¹ *Physics and Politics*, etc. (New York, 1877), p. 21.

² *Der Rassenkampf* (Innsbruck, 1883), p. 244.

³ "L'Esprit de Groupe," *Archives d'Anthropologie criminelle*, Vol. XV, January 15, 1900, p. 5.

⁴ *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V, March, 1895, p. 750. The fact that he did not here italicize the phrase "consciousness of kind," as he did most of the previous rather awkward sentence, shows that he was not at the time impressed with the great importance which he later attached to it. It was only after others, on account of its terseness and agreeable cadence, had emphasized it, that he put it forward as the basis of a system of sociology.

In his principal work, which appeared a year later, he calls this a "sociological postulate," and states it as follows:

The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind*. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself.¹

In his *Elements of Sociology*, 1898, he endeavors to work this conception up into a system capable of being taught to classes, making much use of the term "like-mindedness." In a recent article² he has condensed the principles of his system into ten propositions. In October, 1901, appeared his *Inductive Sociology*, well described by its secondary title as "A Syllabus of Methods, Analyses and Classifications, and Provisionally Formulated Laws." It scarcely goes beyond the consciousness of kind, but is characterized by extensive, I had almost said offensive, schematization.

The importance, however, of this conception cannot be gainsaid, and even if Professor Giddings has not added anything to what has been said by others (which I am far from asserting), he has at least done good service in reviving the discussion of it, and especially of transferring the field of this discussion from morals and biology to sociology, where it properly belongs.

Survival of the social.—If the unconscious principle of association connected with feeling can be designated consciousness of kind, the conscious principle of association connected with reason may be called the survival of the social. The one yields individual satisfaction, the other race safety. It would probably be correct to say, so far at least as human society is concerned, that *society is the result of a recognition of its advantageousness*. But the principle of advantage in biology has led to association in the animal world according to a well-understood law that natural selection unconsciously accomplishes results similar to or identical with those accomplished by reason on the human plane.

There would naturally arise at this point the old question as

¹ *The Principles of Sociology, etc.* (New York, 1896), p. 17.

² *International Monthly*, Vol. II, November, 1900, pp. 553, 554.

to whether man is by nature a social being. It is a true social antinomy in the Kantian sense that both sides can be proved to the satisfaction of some, but, as in the four classical antinomies, the antithesis gains in favor in the light of scientific investigation. The affirmative or dogmatic side of the question is the one that commends itself to superficial observation as well as to the supposed honor of the race, and both these considerations win the mass. The opposite seems false because the men we know are in a sense social, and, besides, it would be a humiliating admission to acknowledge that man is naturally unsocial; neither of which reasons is a legitimate argument. I will not fatigue the reader either with Aristotle's *ξῶον πολιτικόν*, on the one hand, nor with Hobbes's *bellum omnium contra omnes* on the other, but, coming down to more modern times, I shall give a few typical examples of the reasoning on both sides. Comte, for example, speaks of

the essentially spontaneous sociability of the human species, by virtue of an instinctive leaning (*penchant*) toward a life in common, independently of all personal calculation, and often in spite of the strongest individual interests.¹

Darwin devotes a section to "Man as a Social Animal," beginning with the statement that "most persons admit that man is a social being."² He also says: "Judging from the analogy of the greater number of the Quadrumana, it is probable that the early ape-like progenitors of man were likewise social." And he wisely adds: "but this is not of much importance for us."

We may, therefore, dismiss the thesis of this antinomy as established, if stated in this form: Man *is* a social being. But this does not preclude our inquiring whether man always was a social being, and, if not, how he became so. It also leaves open the definition of the term "social" thus used. We saw that the consciousness of kind led to a form of sociability, but here it is limited to the "kind." Toward any other "kind" this attraction becomes repulsion and love becomes hate. It is known that very slight race differences are sufficient to make all this

¹ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, p. 386.

² *Descent of Man*, Vol. I (New York, 1871), p. 81.

difference in the sentiment, and even sections of the same race, gens, or clan that split off from the parent stock may become objects of mutual detestation and permanent hostility. Consciousness of kind, therefore, can only unite very small groups, such as hordes or clans. For that wider sociability that belongs to developed races some other principle is required. The subject will be touched upon under another head. We will restrict it here to the simple question as to the advantageousness of association.

In the first place, Aristotle himself did not maintain that man was naturally social, and attributed his sociality largely to language.¹ But that is little to our purpose. Herbert Spencer, speaking of the laws of multiplication and the antagonism between what he calls individuation and genesis, says: "It forced men into the social state; made social organization inevitable; and has developed the social sentiments."² He also speaks of man as "forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and more in presence of his fellows,"³ and further says:

As fast as the social state establishes itself, the preservation of the society becomes a means of preserving its units. Living together arose because, on the average, it proved more advantageous to each than living apart; and this implies that maintenance of combination is maintenance of the conditions to more satisfactory living than the combined persons would otherwise have. Hence, social self-preservation becomes a proximate aim, taking precedence of the ultimate aim, individual self-preservation.⁴

Finally, in one short sentence he sums up both these motives to sociability by saying: "Though mere love of companionship prompts primitive men to live in groups, yet the chief prompter is experience of the advantages to be derived from co-operation."⁵

Bagehot gives expression to the same truth, all the more instructive because of the different point of view, when he says:

¹ *Politics*, I, 1, 9.

² *Principles of Biology*, Vol. II (New York, 1873), p. 506 (§ 376).

³ *Data of Ethics* (New York, 1879), p. 20 (§ 7).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

⁵ *Contemporary Review*, Vol. XLVI, July, 1884, p. 41. Reprinted in *The Man versus the State*, appended to *Social Statics Abridged and Revised* (New York, 1892), p. 401.

What makes one tribe — one incipient tribe, one bit of a tribe — to differ from another is their relative faculty of coherence. The slightest symptom of legal development, the least indication of military bond, is then enough to turn the scale. The compact tribes win, and the compact tribes are the tamest. Civilization begins, because the beginning of civilization is a military advantage.¹

Galton says :

We may reckon upon the advent of a time when civilization, which is now sparse and feeble and far more superficial than it is vaunted to be, shall overspread the globe. Ultimately it is sure to do so, because civilization is the necessary fruit of high intelligence when found in a social animal, and there is no plainer lesson to be read off the face of Nature than that the result of the operation of her laws is to evoke intelligence in connection with sociability. Intelligence is as much an advantage to an animal as physical strength or any other natural gift, and therefore, out of two varieties of any race of animal who are equally endowed in other respects, the most intelligent variety is sure to prevail in the battle of life. Similarly, among intelligent animals, the most social race is sure to prevail, other qualities being equal.²

Darwin gave numerous illustrations of this in many of his works, as did also M. Edmond Perrier in his book entitled *Le rôle de l'association dans le règne animal et chez les peuplades primitives*. M. Espinas has done the same, and he remarks on the general subject :

There is no need of invoking here the seeking of an advantage for the group, as we have just seen that in the greater number sympathetic instincts are acquired in view of an ulterior utility, of a specific progress, and that social animals have no suspicion of the part that nature is playing for the good of the race in a more or less remote future.³

The principle of the survival of the social, whether in animals or men, was clearly seen by Darwin, who says that "with those animals which were benefited by living in close association, the individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers; while those that cared least for their comrades and lived solitary would perish in greater numbers."⁴ Many will recall the brilliant series of articles on "Mutual Aid among Animals, Savages, etc.," by Prince

¹ *Physics and Politics*, p. 52. ² *Hereditary Genius, etc.* (London, 1892), p. 325.

³ *Sociétés animales*, 2^e édition (Paris, 1878), p. 557.

⁴ *Descent of Man* (New York, 1871), Vol. I, p. 77.

Krapotkin, published some years ago in the *Nineteenth Century* (Vols. XXVIII, XXIX, 1890, 1891), in which he brings out this principle more forcibly perhaps than has been done by any other writer. He concludes that "under *any* circumstances sociability is the greatest advantage in the struggle for life. . . . The fittest are thus the most sociable animals, and sociability appears as the chief factor in evolution" (Vol. XXVIII, p. 711). Of course, as Spencer has pointed out, this is not true of all animals and not generally true of predatory animals, though even here, as in the case of wolves, the advantages of co-operation lead them to live more or less in packs.

With regard to man, Topinard says that "his reason causes him constantly to vacillate between two tendencies: the one of associating with his fellows for the advantage which he expects to derive therefrom, and the other of entirely dispensing with them, of eliminating their competition."¹ And Professor Loria remarks:

Now, whoever applies to sociology the results of biologic and anthropologic science, as reorganized by Darwin, must necessarily consider the social aggregate as an eminently utilitarian institution, intended to secure the welfare and defense of the individual against untoward influences from without. Hence, of two species, one of which is socially organized and the other not, the former has a much greater chance of winning in the struggle for existence; hence, also, in the course of time only the socially organized species survive, while the others, by a fatal law, perish; in this way social organization becomes the universal law of beings.²

On the question of the advantageousness of association there is practical unanimity, and therefore we need not go farther with it. But it does not seem to be perceived that it is the result, like all other steps in development, of a struggle, of opposition coming from the inner nature of man. The biologists see this in animals, and Topinard, in the passage above quoted, predicates it also of the human species, but those, like Comte and Schaeffle,³ who insist that man is by nature a social being, forget

¹ *The Monist*, Vol. VII, July, 1897, p. 512; *Science and Faith* (Chicago, 1899), p. 149.

² *American Anthropologist*, N. S., Vol. I, p. 284.

³ "Vom ersten Anfang ist der Mensch Socialwesen, seine Existenz ist Sein in der Gemeinschaft."—*Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*, zweite Auflage (Tübingen, 1896), Vol. I, p. 235.

or do not perceive that this struggle and final development imply a primarily anti-social nature, and that it is only *advantage* that secures the triumph of association, either through the survival of the fittest and elimination of the unsocial, or else by a greater or less degree of direct rational perception of this advantage and the growing power of interest to overcome innate aversion.

In view of all this it is interesting to note that Immanuel Kant, the "Alleszermalmer," in that important little book¹ which it is so difficult now to consult, although it has been translated into both English and French, clearly saw this primordial dualism, which he calls the antagonism of the capacities for social organization. He says :

By antagonism of this kind I mean the *unsocial sociality* of man ; that is, a tendency to enter the social state combined with a perpetual resistance to that tendency which is continually threatening to dissolve it. Man has gregarious inclinations, feeling himself in the social state more than man by means of the development thus given to his natural tendencies. But he has also strong anti-gregarious inclinations prompting him to insulate himself, which arise out of the unsocial desire (existing concurrently with his social propensities) to force all things into compliance with his own humor ; a propensity to which he naturally anticipates resistance from his consciousness of a similar spirit of resistance to others existing in himself. Now this resistance it is which awakens all the powers of man, drives him to master his propensity to indolence, and in the shape of ambition—love of honor—or avarice impels him to procure distinction for himself amongst his fellows. In this way arise the first steps from the savage state to the state of culture, which consists peculiarly in the social worth of man : talents of every kind are now unfolded, taste formed, and by gradual increase of light a preparation is made for such a mode of thinking as is capable of converting the rude natural tendency to moral distinctions into determinate practical principles, and finally of exalting a social concert that had been pathologically extorted from the mere necessities of situation into a moral union founded on the reasonable choice. But for these anti-social propensities, so unamiable in themselves, which gave birth to that resistance which every man meets with in his own self-interested pretensions, an Arcadian life would arise of perfect harmony and mutual love such as must suffocate and stifle all talents in their very germs.²

¹ *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlichen Absicht*, 1784.

² DE QUINCEY'S translation in the *London Magazine* for October, 1824, Vol. X, p. 387, under the title : "Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan." The paper is contained also in all editions of DE QUINCEY'S *Collected Essays*.

This remarkable passage does credit even to the brain of a Kant. It shows an insight into the nature of man which is almost prophetic and which has not usually been displayed either by the old philosophers or by the modern psychologists. It is an entirely different conception from that of Hobbes and much nearer to the truth. Only a few late writers have partially perceived it. M. Fouillée, for example, remarks :

The social state is the *end* toward which the world seems to be naturally tending, without this end being imposed from without. . . . The world might be defined as an organism which tends to become conscious and voluntary, a republic which tends to realize itself through its own idea. . . . Sociology can furnish, as we see, a particular representation of the universe, a universal type of the world conceived as a society in process of formation, failing here and succeeding elsewhere, aspiring to change mechanical force more and more into justice, and the struggle for existence into fraternity. If such was the case, the essential and indwelling power of all beings, always ready to act the moment circumstances give it access to the light of consciousness, might be expressed by the one word "sociability."¹

And Professor Ludwig Stein says:

Man *is* not, he *is becoming*, sociable. Sociability is not his fundamental nature, his inseparable characteristic, like, for example, his character of two-handedness, but a product of psychic development.²

Upon the whole, then, we may conclude that, while the most enlightened peoples have nearly reached a stage at which it may be truly said that "man, like a cipher, is of no value when standing alone," still the belief, from the observation of such a state, in the innate sociability of man is like all the other erroneous beliefs resulting from the examination of the most highly developed products only. Such thinking costs no effort, but is only worth its cost. It is a sort of *ignava ratio*, and, as Dr. Ross remarks,³ "everything that is being done to bring to light the process of socialization and control contradicts the easy-going theory that actual society is a spontaneous product due to the social instincts of men."

¹ *La science sociale contemporaine* (Paris, 1885), pp. 412-18.

² *Deutsche Rundschau*, XXV. Jahrg., Heft 4, January, 1899, p. 29.

³ AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. III, May, 1898, p. 860.

It may be admitted that the line between instinctive and rational association is difficult to draw, and that it is not always the same as that between other animals and man, but for practical purposes it is sufficient to draw it here, and, with these qualifications, to say that sociology proper deals with rational association or human society.

[*To be continued.*]

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.